The Milwaukee Bucks shrugged off the loss of Jabari Parker like it was no big deal, as if the fifth-smallest NBA market can just afford to waste No. 2 picks.

Parker diminished in importance when Giannis Antetokounmpo emerged as a franchise player, and after the forward tore his left ACL twice, Milwaukee couldn't justify matching a bloated $40-million offer sheet. He was always a tricky fit next to Antetokounmpo, and instead of passing that puzzle to head coach Mike Budenholzer, the Bucks simply cut bait on a talented scorer who averaged 20 points per game as a 22-year-old.

The Bucks' front office will see Parker as a sunk cost, even though they actually wasted another opportunity to surround their star with respectable talent. The Greek Freak remains whimsically loyal, but he's only under team control for another three years, and the capped-out Bucks need to start making meaningful additions instead of explaining setbacks to their superstar.

Same old problems

Letting Parker walk for nothing especially hurts because the Bucks were already starving for assets following years of shortsighted decisions.

Milwaukee shuffled through two team owners, two general managers, and is onto its fourth coach in five seasons since drafting Antetokounmpo. They're short on picks going forward, and have limited trade assets beyond Anteokounmpo and Khris Middleton.

Changes in the front office haven't solved the Bucks' long-standing issues at point guard and center. Repeated attempts by former general manager John Hammond and his successor Jon Horst haven't brought permanent solutions to the two pivotal positions alongside their main pieces.

The point guard woes started in 2015, when Hammond made the head-scratching decision to flip Brandon Knight for Michael Carter-Williams.

Knight was no world beater, but he led the Bucks in scoring and was respected for his range, whereas Carter-Williams appeared to be little more than a confusing vanity project for head coach Jason Kidd, predictably cramping the floor and getting dumped a year later.

In response to that mistake, the Bucks regrettably rang the Raptors for Greivis Vasquez. They coughed up two draft picks for 23 games of inconsistency before Vasquez suffered a career-ending ankle injury. To make matters worse, one of those picks became Norman Powell, who shot 12-of-13 from three-point range as a surprise starter for the Raptors when they eliminated the Bucks from playoff contention in 2017.

The Bucks then threw cap-spike money at their problem by spending $38 million on Matthew Dellavedova in 2016, a move destined for disaster. Dellavedova was one of many glorified backups that excelled when playing next to LeBron James, and couldn't cut it as a starter elsewhere. He quickly lost his spot to Malcolm Brogdon and averaged just four points on 36 percent shooting last season while battling injuries.

Brogdon seemed like a viable long-term solution following a decent Rookie of the Year campaign, but he was strangely benched during the 2017-18 season. That decision frustrated him, and to make matters worse, he suffered a torn quad and was out for months.

Horst cast even more doubt on Brogdon's future by spending two picks on Eric Bledsoe last November. It was a direction that seemed sensible on paper, but the shoot-first guard became an awkward fit. He didn't help the Bucks secure a top-four finish as was expected, and Bledsoe was mercilessly mocked in the playoffs after imploding hilariously over Terry Rozier's innocuous barb.

The center position is another sad story for the Bucks, and it's still an issue following several poorly thought out attempts at a solution.

Their biggest free-agent coup in decades was beating the New York Knicks to plodding post scorer Greg Monroe in 2015, who never fit and was banished to the bench before the All-Star break in his first season in Milwaukee. Kidd had the Bucks scrambling endlessly on defense, and the ground-bound Monroe was the exact opposite of what they needed as their anchor. In retrospect, bidding against the Knicks should have been a warning that signing Monroe wasn't going to end well.

That same summer, the Bucks doubled up on centers by locking up John Henson to a four-year, $44-million contract, only to then bury him on the depth chart as an overpaid backup.

In 2016, the Bucks bid against themselves by handing Miles Plumlee a four-year, $52-million extension. He became a complete non-factor and was quickly flipped for the expiring contracts of Roy Hibbert and Spencer Hawes a year later, and they also both failed to make any impact at center.

Once again, the Bucks doubled up at center by reaching for the largely unknown Thon Maker with the 10th pick in the 2016 draft. He's supposed to be a floor-stretching shot blocker, but that's only in theory. The reality is he's been wildly inconsistent while averaging four points per game on 43 percent shooting.

Henson, the team's longest-tenured mainstay, finally won the starting spot last season, although that's mostly because the Bucks ran out of options. Henson shouldn't feel secure, as Milwaukee spent much of the year trying to trade for DeAndre Jordan, and after that fell through, the Bucks started experimenting by downsizing with Antetokounmpo at center.

They need to be perfect

Milwaukee is fortunate Antetokounmpo is patient and positive, but the Raptors aren't the only franchise planning their future with an eye toward 2021 when he's scheduled to become a free agent.

With limited assets at their disposal, the Bucks can't afford to make any more mistakes. Milwaukee already lost Parker for nothing, they practically have no picks in next year's draft (both of their incoming second-round selections are top-55 protected), and they won't have significant cap room next summer after re-signing Middleton.

Horst is unproven as an executive and he's off to a questionable start, but signing a former Coach of the Year in Budenholzer was a good decision. He's a creative manager capable of developing players and building elite defenses, two of the biggest areas of concern for the Bucks.

Improving the defense should be the most attainable goal, as Budenholzer once built a top-six defense around Kyle Korver. Antetokounmpo, Middleton, and Bledsoe are all plus defenders for their positions, but the Bucks need a stabilizing presence who can rebound and disrupt paint shots. They finished 29th in both defensive rebounding percentage and foul rate last year, which shows a lack of cohesion and discipline. Budenholzer needs to tighten the screws with his new team.

A prospect with question marks making a leap would give Milwaukee its most realistic path to contention. If Budenholzer can turn DeMarre Carroll, a career journeyman, into a $60-million player, he should be able to salvage something from Maker, Brogdon, D.J. Wilson, and Donte DiVincenzo.

Meanwhile, it's imperative for Horst to find some credible shooters to open the floor for the walking double team that is Antetokounmpo. Milwaukee asked 40-year-old Jason Terry to play 20 minutes in Game 7 against the Celtics, and that's just embarrassing. Adding Ersan Ilyasova is fine, but he struggles to stay healthy and is best suited to be a substitute.

Horst also needs to choose wisely between Bledsoe and Brodgon when selecting his point guard of the future. Brogdon is a better shooter, doesn't dominate the ball, and figures to be more affordable, which should make him the obvious choice. However, since he already spent two picks on Bledsoe last season, Horst will be questioned if he lets him walk.

Milwaukee's immediate goal should be to show progress. The Bucks have already flamed out in the first round three times with Antetokounmpo, so a trip to the second round is absolutely vital to avoid growing questions about his future. But they failed to upgrade their roster this summer, and only have until 2021 to get it right.

The clock is ticking in Milwaukee.

(Photos courtesy: Getty Images)